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This study was designed to provide empirical data which
would shew what relationship existed among nine human factors
and combat effectiveness of soldiers on the battlefield.
These human factors were: leadership, training, combat
experience, perception of survival possibility, acceptance
by the unit, fatigue, hunger, the ability to withstand fire,
and a soldier's belief in what he was doing was right. The
study focused upon a sample of fifty Army infantry battalion
commanders within the continental United States who had
served as small-unit combat leaders in Vietnam. Data was
obtained by the use of a mailed survey. The respondents
tended to agree that among all of the human factors, leader-
ship was strongly related to combat effectiveness. Among the
nine human factors, respondents felt that leadership and
training were the most important human factors relating to
combat effectiveness. The respondents commented extensively
that cohesion, training, belief in what they were doing, and
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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study was to determine to what degree
various human factors affected combat effectiveness and the
soldier's will to fight on the battlefield. Hopefully, by
providing empirical data showing to what extent different
human factors were relevant or irrelevant in battle, combat
effectiveness would be better understood.
Since the end of World War I, immense efforts have been
invested by individuals in many disciplines to try to define
the criteria that would accurately define and measure combat
effectiveness. Marshall (1947) presented interesting data
gathered from observation of infantry units engaged in combat
Keegan (19 76) did an extensive study of significant battles
which provided a detailed account of the behavior of soldiers
in combat. Richardson (19 78) did a study on the psychologi-
cal factors of combat based on his experiences as a psychia-
trist in the British army during World War II.
Currently, a large amount of resources is being utilized
by the Army to try to assess the combat effectiveness of
units at ail levels. The assessment techniques used range
from the use of extensive tactical evaluation programs to the
sophisticated simulation projects in the area of operations
research
.
Different terminology has been denoted to define the con-
cept of combat effectiveness. For the purpose of this study,

the term combat effectiveness was used in the context des-
cribed by Sarkesian (19 80) . He linked the terms readiness,
cohesion, and effectiveness as part of the military effective-
ly
ness equation. Readiness was the level of tactical and
technical proficiency of the unit and the operational state
of its equipment and logistics it required to perform its
mission. Cohesion referred to the attitudes and commitment
of the individual soldiers to the integrity of the unit, the
will to fight, and the degree to which these were in accord
with societal and individual values . For a unit to be combat
effective, it must have demonstrated readiness and cohesion.
It is inconceivable that a unit could be or remain combat
effective without being both cohesive and combat ready. This
study addressed combat effectiveness as defined by Sarkesian
with one exception. The area of operational readiness of
equipment and logistics was not discussed in any depth. Immense
work in these areas has already been done by operation
researchers
.
Ultimately, the only real measure of combat effectiveness
is the performance of a unit in combat. Naturally, combat
effectiveness must somehow be measured prior to entering
battle. 3y accurately measuring combat ef fectivenss , meaning-
ful training objectives can be defined that will adequately
and realistically prepare soldiers for combat.
The measurement of combat effectiveness and the will to
fight has been a complex and difficult task. Researchers
have been quite successful in simulating and measuring

factors of combat effectiveness such as optimal firepower
ratios and logistical support. But it is much more difficult
to quantify and measure intangible factors of combat effec-
tiveness such as leadership or fear or combat experience.
''These intangible factors (or human factors) are basic to the
understanding of combat effectiveness and the soldier's will
to fight. The fact that combat units have substantial logis-
tical support or superior firepower does not necessarily
assure combat effectiveness and, ultimately, victory on the
battlefield. This is clearly evident in historical battles
such as the fall of Malaya to the Japanese in World War
II [Manchester, 19 7 3] and the Israeli defense of the Golan
Heights in 1973 [Herzog, 1975].
To understand what makes a unit combat effective or why a
soldier fights, the individual soldier and his social inter-
actions at the squad, platoon, and company level must be
studied. It could be argued that how effective a brigade or
a division is depended upon the fighting ability that is
manifested at the company level. The performance of front-
line soldiers in the heat of battle could collectively deter-
mine the combat effectiveness of higher echelon units. It
is at the company level and below that the human factors play
an important role in determining how well a soldier fights.
One example is leadership. The brigade and division commanders'
primary mission in combat has been to command and control
subordinate units in battle. . This entailed moving and shifting
10

large units to stem an attack or to capture an objective. In
contrast, the company commander and his subordinate leaders
have the task of directly motivating and leading soldiers
in combat.
This study concentrated on examining combat effectiveness
of soldiers within a company-size unit. Hopefully, cause-
and-effect relationships between subjective human factors and
combat effectiveness would become clearer and less ambiguous
at this level.
Presently, the criteria used in the military to judge the
combat effectiveness of units have traditionally been per-
formance on formal training exercises, availability of per-
sonnel, and operational maintenance. What is lacking was the
assessment of combat effectiveness based on the human factors
that were relevant on the battlefield. Sarkesian (1980) des-
cribed the drawbacks of current assessment techniques. Measur-
l
ing subjectivity using quantitative data in a manner similar
to objective measures were at best inconclusive and not reflec-
tive of the units ability to perform in combat f nor indicative
of the soldiers will to fight, his commitment to the mission of
the unit, and his acceptance and commitment to the ideology
that has placed him on the battlefield in the first place.
Indeed, measures have been developed to try to assess these
human factors, but these remain peripheral and lack serious
analytical depth. It is difficult to say with certainty that
a unit would become effective on the battlefield because it
11

performed well on its Army Training and Evaluation Program
(ARTEP) or passed the annual general inspection.
Many articles and books have been written that focus on
the subjective factors of combat. Most have been written by
historians or social scientists who have based their writ-
ings on historical research. These accounts of battle tended
to not capture all of the reality of war due to the authors
'
superficial understanding of combat and lack of background
in military theory.
Perhaps the best method to establish the criteria that
could better help to understand and to predict combat effec-
tiveness was to ask the men who actually led soldiers into
J
combat. S.L.A. Marshall (1947) felt that nobody knew more
about combat than the small-unit leader. He wrote:
One of the deterrents to the adoption of new concepts
is that company officers and non-coms rarely write
of their combat experiences. Even when they do so
they are unlikely to search into the reason or nature
of them, usually because their experiences are narrow
and personal. Also, they have no way of gauging
what things are typical or characteristic.
In consequence , most of our textbooks and commen-
taries on leadership and the mastery of the moral
problem of battle are written by (authors) who are
either wholly lacking in combat experience or have
been for long periods so far removed from the
reality of small arms action that they have come to
forget what were once their most vital convictions
and impressions.
Thus, the focus of this paper was to obtain a basic
understanding of combat effectiveness through the data provided
by men who have fought in combat as infantry leaders. The
12

data these soldiers provided was paramount in understanding
why soldiers fight.
In order to clarify the problem and in an attempt to
isolate a set of hypotheses, three basic assumptions were
made
:
1. That the human factors used in this study were experi-
enced in Vietnam.
2. That since the majority of battles fought in Vietnam
were infantry battles, the officers currently on active duty
with the most combat experience were infantrymen.
3. That infantry battalion commanders currently in com-
mand have obtained combat experience as small-unit leaders
in Vietnam.
Human factors, as defined for purposes of this study, were
those factors that could psychologically affect a soldier's
will to fight and significantly influence whether a unit is
combat effective or not. v Combat effectiveness of a unit was
based on the sum effect of these factors on each of the soldiers
within a particular unit. These human factors will be studied
in more detail in Chapter II. There were a total of nine






3. perception of survival possibility







8. acceptance and sense of belonging to unit (cohesion)
9. a soldier's belief that what he is doing is right.
The present study examined the perceptions of infantry
battalion commanders of to what degree these nine human fac-
tors affect combat effectiveness. It was assumed that based
on the sample's combat experience, information could be for-
mulated that would provide some consensus on what human factors
have a significant relationship to combat effectiveness. A
survey addressing these nine factors were mailed to battalion
commanders throughout the Army.
Based on the assumptions and the nine human factors, the
specific area of study was narrowed to a single, twofold,
question: Which of these human factors were important or
detrimental to combat effectiveness and the enhancement of
the soldier's will to fight; and, was it possible for soldiers
to be trained to withstand the psychological rigors of combat.
The major hypothesis of this study was that certain human
factors were significantly related to combat effectiveness,
while other factors tended to be insignificantly related.
Concurrently, it was also hypothesized that soldiers could
be properly prepared during peacetime to withstand the
psychological rigors of combat.
The procedures used in this study will be described in
detail in Chapter III of this paper. Before describing these
14

procedures, however, it is necessary to briefly review the
literature that relates to effectiveness on the battlefield
15

II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
A. OVERVIEW
There have been a variety of studies that have used
different approaches to analyze combat effectiveness. This
study reviewed the literature pertaining to combat effective-
ness by looking at six different approaches—cohesion, the
effects of fire, leadership, training, the effects of stress,
and the motivation to fight.
B. COHESION
Tactical cohesion is defined by Hauser (1980) as the
ability of a military unit to hold together and to sustain
mission effectiveness despite extreme combat stress. 'Marshall
(1947) feels that tactical cohesion is that which enables a
group of soldiers to make the most of their united strength
and to deal effectively with life-threatening crisis situations
Tactical cohesion comes from the growth of unit confidence
which, in turn, derives from a soldier's increased awareness
and utilization of his own resources under conditions which
at. first seem extraordinary but gradually become familiar.
Shils and Janowitz (1948) wrote extensively on cohesion
within the German Army during World War II. They attributed
the excellent fighting ability exhibited by the Germans as a
direct result of the intense cohesion within the primary




The primary group provided the individual soldier with
basic organic needs, affection, esteem from both peers and
superiors, and a definition of his purpose in battle. In
return, the primary group expected fierce loyalty to the group
and adherence to its functioning procedures.
Shils and Janowitz hypothesized that a soldier's ability
to resist is directly related to the ability of his immedi-
ate primary group to avoid social disintegration. It was
only when social disintegration occurred that German units
became combat ineffective. Group cohesion was weakened by
both spatial and physical variables. Isolation, the insti-
tution of an individual replacement system, and the reduction
of food and medical services contributed to the collapse of
most German units at the end of the war.
* The German Army realized the value of small-group dynamics
that affected front-line soldiers. Commanders saw that soli-
darity was fostered by the recollection of jointly experienced
gratifications and that the units who experienced victory to-
gether should not be dissolved but should be maintained as a
cohesive group. Thus, their replacement system operated by
this concept during most of the war. The entire composition
of the division would be withdrawn from the front simultane-
ously and refitted as a unit with replacements. New members
were given the opportunity to be assimilated into the group
in a less stressful environment. Eventually, the unit would
be sent back to the front as a whole.
17

Schein (1961) discussed the importance of primary groups
to survival. v Primary group loyalties among the Korean pri-
soners-of-war (POWs) constituted their chief hope of survival
and success in an extremely hostile environment. To the ex-
tent that the captors were able to isolate the individual
POW from the support of his fellow prisoners physically and
psychologically, they were better able to exhort cooperation
and collaboration from him. Conversely, to the extent that
the POWs could cleave together in close primary groups, they
were better able to frustrate the efforts of their captors to
dominate them completely. The strength of the POW was drawn
from the same fundamental source as that of the fighting man
under fire— from the individual's faith in and sense of
responsibility for his fellow comrades in his primary combat
group
.
4 Coates and Pellegrin (1965) viewed primary groups to be
dynamic in nature. Discharges, casualties, and replacements
may radically alter the composition of the group as time
passes. As new members learn the ways of the existing group,
they also contribute to and change the sub-culture, bringing
in new ideas and causing realignments of the inter-personal
relationships among the group members. The longer the group's
history and the more stable the social climate within which
it operates, the more stable and resistant to change it is
likely to become.
Experimental studies have drawn similar conclusions on
the effects of small-group dynamics. According to Janiss
18

[Hellreigel and Slocum, 1979], a phenomenon called "groupthink"
has occurred in decision-making groups. In small groups
there was an illusion of invulnerability which created opti-
mism and encourages members to take extreme risks. Collective
rationalization prevented members of the group to hesitate
or reconsider their assumptions. Stereotyped views of the
enemy developed which portrayed it as evil. There was direct
pressure on an individual who expressed disagreement with group
goals and tasks to conform. An important phenomenon that
occurred was self-censorship of an individual's deviated views
or opinions. This reflected the inclination of members to
minimize to themselves the importance of their doubts. This
characteristic was partly the result of self-censorship. Finally,
there was the characteristic of self-appointed "mindguards "
.
These certain members protected the group from adverse infor-
mation that could shelter the complacency about the effective-
ness or morality of the group tasks.
After an exhaustive literature review/ Stein (19 76) con-
cluded that conflict definitely affected cohesion within a
group. He found that external conflict did increase internal
cohesion under certain conditions. These conditions acted as
intervening variables and involved the nature of the external
conflict and the nature of the group. The external conflict
needed to involve some threat, affected the entire group and
all its members equally and involved a solution in alleviating
the threat. The group needed to have been an ongoing conflict
19

with some apparent preexisting cohesion and have leadership
that could authoritatively enforce cohesion. Finally, the
group must have been able to deal with the external conflict
and to provide emotional comfort and support to its members.
Cohesion and morale have been shown to be intertwined and
have significant influence on each other. Chester, Van
Steenberg, and Bruencke (1955) conducted a study to determine
the effect on morale of infantry team replacement and indi-
vidual replacement systems. The teams in the study consisted
of four men each. On the basis of the findings, the researchers
concluded that the system of sending team replacements for
infantry units based overseas would result in higher morale
and higher combat efficiency. Currently, studies on recon-
stitution of combat units have been undertaken to better
understand the dynamics of the issue [Etheridge and Anderson,
1981].
v Morale has been identified to be an important element of
cohesiveness [Heymbeeck, 1968]. Marshall (1947) wrote that
morale was the essence of an army. It was morale that com-
prised the total complex body of army thought.
v Richardson (19 78) identified three elements of morale.
The first element was the soldier's personal or individual
morale. It was sustained by both physical and mental factors.
The physical factors that sustained personal morale were good
health, good food, and rest. v Mental factors were much more
involved and are considered by Richardson to have been more
vital in preserving morale. These mental factors were:
20

1. Possessed an understanding of the cause he was
fighting for.
2. Have self-confidence in his ability as a soldier and
a belief he was a better soldier than the enemy.
3. Sound religious belief and moral principle.
4. A sense of responsibility for others.
Morale of the small group was basically sustained by
three factors. These factors were:
1. Membership was contented and had confidence in its
leaders
.
2. Confidence in and respect for fellow soldiers.
2. An intense determination not to disappoint comrades
or the unit.
v Richardson felt that the small group factors helped the
trained soldier to react to danger as a member of a group
rather than as an individual. These sustainment factors
balanced his personal instincts of self-preservation against
the group instincts that are directed to a common resolution
to overcome fear and danger for the good of the unit.
v Finally, there was unit morale. Richardson believed that
unit morale did not grow automatically but must have been
deliberately fostered and nurtured. If unit morale was lost,
it could take a long time to rebuild. Unit morale is evident
by the esprit de corps that permeates throughout the organi-




C. THE EFFECTS OF FIRE
The indirect and direct fire firepower an infantry soldier
would face in the next war would probably be more massive and
devastating than ever seen before. Threat armies have built
their ground forces and tactics around the doctrine of pon-
derour and massive artillery finre. The fire a front-line
soldier will experience will most likely have an adverse
effect to his combat effectiveness. An example of how massively
artillery can be employed is the siege of Berlin by Soviet
Army in 19 45. It was estimated that the Soviets assigned the
firepower of one artillery piece for every thirteen feet of
frontage during their final offensive. The results were
devastating and the German Army collapsed a few days later
[Ryan, 1966] .
v When lethal weapons are used in combat, there are two
types of effects that occur. The first type of effect is
injury or physical damage to the target. This is the primary
task of the weapon. The second type of effect is psychologi-
cal. The psychological effect of artillery is a secondary
task and in the vast majority of the time weapons are not
designed for this particular type of task. Yet, the psycho-
logical effect may be the most detrimental factor to combat
effectiveness
.
Although the weapon was not primarily designed for its
psychological impact, the employment of artillery as sup-
pressive fire was directed to the psychology of the soldier.
22

Fear was the most common reaction of soldiers under indirect
fire attack. Fear could lead to behavior that could compro-
mise his assigned individual task as well as the mission of
the unit as a whole [Swann, 1972].
v The most extreme psychological effect was when a soldier
became so highly stressed because of artillery bombardment
that he psychologically departed from reality. According to
Naylor (1964) , the battle ingredient most apt to "break" a
soldier was the explosion of a shell in the immediate vicinity.
One study [Watson, 1978] of 115 consecutive patients diagnosed
as blast-concussed showed that 10 5 were suffering mainly from
a form of acute anxiety resulting from exposure to a nearby
explosion. These cases were diagnosed as battle fatigue and
will be discussed in more detail later.
A less severe effect of indirect fire that occurred on
the battlefield more frequently. An example was given by Swann
of hew behavior that did not relate to the real situation
could happen. There have been numerous cases where soldiers
have fallen asleep at their positions during an intense battle.
These men have become so highly stressed that their behavior
was not purposeful to the situation. Because of this nonpro-
ductive behavior these soldiers have degraded their unit's
effectiveness
.
According to Swann, the most detrimental effect of sup-
pression that lead to combat ineffectiveness was the inhibi-
tion of behavior. A soldier has been trained to respond to
23

threatening fire by taking protective cover and by avoiding
exposure. Consequently, if his response was to take cover,
he was prevented from carrying out his assigned mission.
The degree to which he was inhibited depended upon how
stressed the individual is by the bombardment.
Experimental studies conducted by Swann (19 71) provided
some data that defined the characteristics of a defender
rendered ineffective by artillery suppression. The soldier
did not observe and fire into his fields of fire at the enemy
thirty percent of the time, he stayed under protective cover
for periods longer than one minute, and he failed to meet the
assault phase of the enemy attack with fire. A squad member
was temporarily reduced to performance as an individual be-
cause he could not effectively communicate with the other
members of his unit. v If the soldier was attacking, he was
eliminated from being an effective team player on his squad
if he failed to respond to communication in less than thirty
seconds. If the soldier was manning a defensive position,
he would cease to be an effective soldier if he fails to
respond to communication within ninety seconds.
''Marshall (1947) found that when an advancing infantry line
encountered intense enemy fire and the soldiers sought cover
which physically prevented them from seeing one another, moral
disintegration occurred. All organizational unity vanished
temporarily and the unit ceased to be effective. What was a
combat force now became a scattering of individuals.
24

The effect of suppression could be so severe that soldiers
would be more concerned in finding cover and not employing
their own weapon systems. ' Marshall surprisingly found that
not more than twenty-five percent of men egaged in battle
would fire their weapons and actively fight. This fact alone
greatly diminished a unit's combat effectiveness in terms of
ratio of firepower with the enemy. Swann (19 71) found that a
soldier spent less than ten percent of his time firing at the
enemy, or he failed to be aware of the location and action of
the nearby friendlies, or for periods greater than four
minutes he did not fire or look at the enemy.
In seme cases it was not the physical casualties that
rendered a unit combat ineffective. Mills and Yale [Watson,
1978] undertook a study of human reactions to fragmentation
weapons. They were interested in the distances over which
various weapons would cause soldiers to keep their heads down
and prevent them from effectively returning fire. The study
tried to determine at what non-lethal ranges was artillery
affecting them. They found that the soldiers were affected
by incoming artillery that impacted at ranges forty percent
more than lethal range.
D. LEADERSHIP
Etzioni (1965) defined leadership as the ability to elicit
the follower's response in a broad range of matters. This
ability was based on the personal qualities of the leader.
It was this definition of leadership that most typified a
25

small-unit leader's role in combat. Vit was considered the
leader's sole responsibility to accomplish the assigned
mission of his unit, to motivate men to follow him into
battle, and to control fear among his troops.
There were at least two aspects of leadership— the quality
that enabled a man to confidently formulate a plan of action
and his ability to persuade others to carry out the planned
action. Success was the bridge between these two aspects.
Once men were satisfied that their leader "had it in him" to
lead successfully, they no more questioned his ability but
gladly committed their lives to his keeping [Moran, 1967],
v The impact of leadership on group behavior could be power-
ful . The results of a study completed by Bey (19 72) showed
how organizational stress significantly increased with the
departure of the commander. These units had commanders who
were effective as leaders, idolized by their men, and estab-
lished informal ties with their subordinates. Some units did
not become effective again until months later. Heymbeeck
(1968) found that confusing and contradictory orders issued
by leaders significantly increased the stress level of his
soldiers
.
v 3ased on his observations, Marshall (1947) listed the
characteristics a leader should possess to successfully pre-
pare and lead his men into combat. These were:
1. Emphasis on the care of soldiers.





4. A basic understanding of the simple fact that soldiers
wished to think of themselves as soldiers and that
all military information was nourishing for their
morale.
5. Courage, innovation, and physical fitness.
6. An innate respect for the dignity of the position and
the work of other men.
Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, one of the most competent
tacticians in World War II, was an avid student of the art
of leadership. Based on his experiences, he wrote:
The tactical leader of the future, who will de-
cide the battle— for the main emphasis of future
battles will be on the tactical destruction of the
enemy's fighting powers—will need not only mental
gifts of high order, but also great strength of
character if he is to be a match for his task. Be-
cause of the great variety of tactical possibilities
which motorization offers, it will in the future
be impossible to make more than a rough forecast of
the course of the battle. This being so, the issue
will be decided by flexibility of mind, eager
acceptance of responsibility, a fitting mixture of
caution and audacity, and the greater control over
the fighting troops. [Hart, 19 53]
Rommel continued to elaborate on the necessary traits of
a successful leader. v The leader must have been tactically
and technically competent. He must have initiative and
energy. A leader must have led by personal example. And,
finally, the leader must have tried to establish personal
contact with his men, but without weakening his authority.
Anecdotal evidence and some experimental studies have
shown leadership to be an important factor in the determination
27

of combat effectiveness. A more in-depth discussion of the
theories of leadership was beyond the scope of this study.
Extensive research have provided some inconclusive data on
leadership that could be applied to leader-soldier relation-
ships [Fiedler, 1964; Hersey and Blanchard, 1969].
E. TRAINING
The purpose of training was to ingrain into the soldier
the skills necessary to survive and to fight effectively on
the battlefield. It has been the ultimate goal of training
to teach soldiers to instinctively perform basic tasks such
as marksmanship, movement and his basic assigned mission as
a member of a combat unit. Training has been the essence of
the learning process in the military. Koman (19 71) concluded
that individual performance increased proportionally to the
extent to which certain activities could be automated, which
in turn left more room for mental work. This could only be
achieved through long training and in collaboration with
weapon systems.
One of the early proponents of the belief that training
was an important ingredient to combat effectiveness was
General George S. Patton. In 1918, he wrote:
The object of all training is to create a Corps
d 1 Elite, that is a body of men who are not only
capable of helping to win this war, but are deter-
mined to do so. It cannot be emphasized too often
that all training, at all times and at all places,
must aim at the cultivation of the OFFENSIVE
SPIRIT in all ranks... [Blumenson, 1972]
28

Patton firmly believed that soldiers must understand that
the skill they gained during training would have a direct
result on the battlefield. Military instruction was not a
matter of getting through a definite subject or time period,
but of employing time to the fullest advantage. One of
Patton 's fundamental principles was that "tactics are the
foundation of all training, for training has as its object
the preparation of the soldier for war."
Collins (19 78) , a former army general, had put together a
working philosophy of training for leaders. He believed that
the essential characteristics of a good army were that it is
well trained and well disciplined. Discipline derived and
flowed from training and served to emphasize the fundamental
point of the all encompassing nature of training. He stated
that "training permeates everything a military organization
does."
Collins wrote that success in battle was dependent on the
coordinated effort of a number of small combat units working
together to accomplish a mission. He further elaborated:
Other things being equal, the army with the best
trained small units will prevail. Even when other
things are not equal, the army with skilled soldiers
and determined small units will sometimes defeat
bigger and better equipped armies and will often
confound and outlast their adversaries.
It should be noted that training should be relevant to
the type of warfare being waged. Specifically, there were
major differences in a conventional war vis-a-vis an uncon-
ventional war that should be taken into account in preparing
29

soldiers to fight effectively. For example, a soldier fight-
ing guerillas should be better able to identify the enemy;
to psychologically deal with the hit-and-run tactics of
the enemy; and; to understand that the "offensive spirit"
and possession of territory won in battle was sometimes
meaningless in unconventional warfare [Burchett, 1966]
.
Military men agreed that there was not a better way to
prepare men for combat than with good training. Although
the Army placed heavy emphasis on training, evaluation tools
used to assess training as an indicator for combat effective-
ness were far from perfect. Medlin (1979) cited five major
weaknesses of the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP)
used to assess combat effectiveness of tactical units. These
were
:
1. Lack of standardized or scientific procedures for
determining the individual and unit tasks that must
be performed in combat.
2. Field exercises are often unrealistic and did not
provide objective data for the evaluation team.
Rarely was a combat environment simulated properly.
3. The ARTE? manual provided little or no guidance to
evaluators on how to design exercise, to measure unit
performance, or to evaluate the observed performance.
4. Lack of guidance on how users were to deal with the
partially stochastic nature of combat.
5
.
The ARTEP did not provide guidance in how to develop




Taking an opposite view, Sorley (1979) felt that reliance
on statistical indicators to evaluate training was debilitating
and damaging to combat readiness. He viewed statistical
methods as being inherently flawed, sterile, and uninforma-
tive in judging performance. Training should be based on




The concept of combat effectiveness cannot be thoroughly
analyzed without discussing battlefield stress and its affect
on the behavior of the combatant. Of the various situations
which produced stress, combat was one of the most severe;
prolonged fatigue, extended wakefulness, and great physical
exertion aggravated the effects of the ever-present threat to
survival [Davis, et al., 1955].
Grinker and Spiegel (19 63) conducted a classic study on
the effects of combat stress on Air Force fliers during World
War II. The authors compiled and analyzed hundreds of case
studies of men suffering from different degrees of combat
stress. They identified two aspects of stress—emotional
and physical.
The authors described the type of emotional stress encoun-
tered by men in battle as a complex network of unusual strains
inherent in the combat environment. The stress was derived
from different sources which mutually reinforced each other.
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V Although these sources were completed and interwoven, they
could be reduced to four principle categories
:
1. The threat of personal injury or death.
2. The injury or death of friends with its powerful
effect on intragroup dynamics.
3. The necessity to engage in a continually hostile and
destructive activity.
4. The sum effect of all the strains, both physical and
emotional, on the soldier's motivation to remain in
combat.
The intensity of the problems resulting from emotional
and physical stress varied greatly in individual cases. Every-
one seemed to react to stress somewhat differently. At times
during a battle the motivation became so intense, the morale
so high, that soldiers were stimulated to tremendous feats
of endurance, completely disregarding their physical fatigue
and their fears. At other times, the morale was so low that
even the slightest stress becomes unendurable. Grinker and
Spiegel concluded that, in general, there was a fixed limit
of tolerance to the stress of combat. If this limit was ex-
ceeded, combat fatigue and other stress disorders could occur.
A study done by a Johns Hopkins University research team
(1952) concluded that, theoretically, every man had a breaking
point. The study identified three factors that predisposed





1. Close and prolonged contact with friends killed or
seriously wounded.
2. Incoming artillery and mortar fire, as opposed to
small arms fire and close combat.
3. Being alone in a position of relative security where
the pressure of interdependence was eliminated.
The study also concluded that some of the most important
factors in establishing combat effectiveness was the cohe-
siveness of the small fighting group and the interdependence
of the individuals.
The effects of the stress of isolation from a group could
be extremely detrimental to an individual's well-being. Studies
[Haggard, 1969] have shown that isolation could result in
rapid ego disintegration, withdrawal, despair, hallucinations,
and violent emotional reactions such as uncontrollable rage
or self-pity. The inability to cope with isolation could lead
to death. Thus, normal functioning of an individual depended
in part on the existence of an environment with which he was
familiar and could act effectively.
3ourne (19 70) found that, all things being equal, the
incidence of combat stress casualties varied considerably
from one unit to another. He attributed the differences to
the degree of morale in each unit. In this context morale
was described by Bourne as the sense of well-being enjoyed by
the group, confidence in their ability to survive in combat,




Sohlberg (1976) , a psychologist for the Israeli Defense
Forces, identified four factors that were described by
soldiers in the Yom Kippur War as extremely stressful.
These were:
1. The sudden transition from peace to a full-blown
war situation.
2. The physical and psychological strain and stress
related to combat in general.
3. The abrupt transition from a period of heavy fighting
to a period of relative quiet after the ceasefire.
4. The loss of comrades and the problem of survival guilt.
The physical stress of combat was compounded by the effects
of emotional stress previously discussed. The effects of
physical stress are cumulative and could only be curtailed
by the removal of the individual from combat activity. Appel
(196 6) produced evidence that length of time in combat was
directly related to the incidence of battle fatigue. After
eighty to one-hundred days of combat exposure the psychologi-
cal vulnerability of the soldier increased sharply with a
probability that his effectiveness would decline.
A lack of sleep and proper nutrition contributed greatly
to the stress encountered by the soldier. iMenninger [Bourne,
1970] identified inadequate diet, chronic physical discom-
fort, exhaustion, and physical illness as contributing to a
high incidence of psychiatric casualties.
The literature generally agreed that fatigue was the most
predominant of the factors that caused physical stress. From
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a series of experimental studies, Drucker et al., (1969)
found that that the performance of soldiers decreased signifi-
cantly after forty-eight hours of sleep deprivation. Similar
studies [Haggard, 1969] on sustained operations supported
these findings.
Petersen (1971) viewed fatigue as an especially degrading
factor to combat effectiveness. According to Petersen, the
leader had the primary responsibility of minimizing fatigue
and sustaining combat effectiveness. Effective training and
experience should be applied to minimize the impact of fatigue
in combat. Leaders should be able to identify men who were
excessively fatigued and relieve them temporarily. Commanders
should take action to prevent the ill effects of rumors,
panic, and discouragement. Fatigued soldiers would more likely
be susceptible to these influences. Finally, effective leader-
ship encouraged self-confidence in subordinates which is essen-
tial for coping with fatigue in combat.
Although extreme stress could possibly be devastating to
combat effectiveness, measures could be taken to minimize its
effects. Immense progress had been made in the psychiatric
field to deal with combat fatigue cases. For example, only
six percent of all medical evacuations from Vietnam were for
psychiatric reasons as compared to twenty-three percent in
World War II [Bourne, 1970]
.
Some research has been done to attempt to identify indi-
viduals who may be predisposed to combat fatigue. This type
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of research is the basis of preventive psychiatry that can
reduce psychiatric casualties and increase combat effectiveness
V Grinker and Spiegler (1963) found that men suffering from
severe combat stress either had latent or overt neurosis, low
thresholds of anxiety, or were considered non-team players.
Bourne (19 70) found that psychiatric casualties in Vietnam
consisted mainly of soldiers who either were not assimilated
in their primary group during their first few weeks in combat,
had poorer military records, or had a higher rate of disci-
plinary actions against them. The Johns Hopkins University
study (19 52) characterized high-risk individuals as having
a background of poor parental relationships, poor civilian
occupational pattern, anxiety at both the rifle range and
the infiltration course, and low intelligence.
The key to adapting to the effects of stress on the battle-
field was learning to cope with the hardships and strains
encountered. Dimsdale (19 78) interviewed numerous former
concentration camp inmates to try to determine how did they
learn to cope with the extreme amount of stress placed upon
them. He identified seven major styles of coping that were
used during their imprisonment. These were:
1. Differential focus on the good . Camp inmates adjusted
their ideas of pleasure so that these ideas were
congruent with the environment.
2. Survival for some purpose . For example, to seek
revenge or help a friend through the hardship.
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3. Psychological removal . This involved hardening of
one's feeling or denial.
4. Concept and mastery . The inmate tried to express some
type of autonomy and control over his own destiny.
5. The will to live . The most fundamental element of
coping.
6. The mobilization of hope . This gave the inmates
something permanent to hold on to.
7. Group Affiliation . This was vital in providing sup-
port, information, and protection. It was also impor-
tant in reinforcing the person's sense of individuality
and self-worth.
Soldiers became "battle hardened" by becoming less aware
of his surroundings and desensitized to his own feelings.
Gray (19 59) wrote:
The routine of military life, the repetition,
drill, and uniformity of response, works to dampen and
dull any individual intensity of awareness. Even the
civilian soldier who finds the military way quite
alien and strange can learn to hold fast to the few
simple rules, to be a proper cog in the vast
machine, and to suspend thoughts that might unfit
him for his appointed mission. He learns to expect
orders from above and pass them along to those
under his control. Thinking tends to become not
only painful but more and more unnecessary.
Finally, Koranyi (19 77) echoed the beliefs of many mili-
tary men by stating that the two most important factors
capable of preserving stress-endurance in soldiers were the
quality of leadership and the quality of leadership and
the thoroughness of their training.
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G. THE WILL TO FIGHT
Many authors have written on the reasons why soldiers
fight. The basic issue was whether a soldier fought for
simply patriotic reasons or for other less glorious but basic
reasons
.
^ Hauser (1980) identified submission as a basic motivator
to fight. By simply being a soldier, an individual submitted
himself to legitimate authority. He was made to endure the
hardships and the strains of training and combat by his su-
periors. Ultimately, the soldier would continue to submit
to the orders of legitimate authority, even though the orders
may be contrary to his fundamental instincts of self-
preservation. Once the legitimacy of his superior's authority
was lost, military order disintegrated. The end product
could be disobedience and loss of military effectiveness.
The willingness to endure battle was contingent upon de-
finite psychological awards in the form of continued affec-
tion, interest, support, and appreciation. An effective
combat soldier lived and died for his primary group. He
fought effectively to meet the perceived expectation of him
by his buddies. He was rewarded by their appreciation and
their own self-sacrifice for him. His motivation continued
because his suffering and possible death has the greatest
meaning to his friends in his combat unit. Anything which
indicated indifference to the war is interpreted as to be






In the present study the population of interest was
limited to U.S. Army infantry officers in the rank of lieu-
tenant colonel. At the time of this study, all of these
officers were in command of an infantry battalion. The
assumption was made that these officers had combat experience
in Vietnam either as platoon leaders or company commanders.
It was also assumed that since only a select few lieutenant
colonels are chosen to command a battalion, these officers
were most likely the best in their profession and had an
excellent combat record. The representative sample was chosen
from active Army divisions in the continental United States
and Hawaii. Battalion commanders of eleven of the sixteen
Army divisions were represented in the study. Every infantry
battalion commander within these divisions were mailed a
survey. The commanders sampled represented mechanized, air-
borne, airmobile, and light infantry structured battalions.
The return rate was seventy-six percent.
The sample fairly represented the population of infantry
lieutenant colonels in the Army. It was assumed that due to
a centralized command selection process, most of the popula-
tion had combat experience that was similar. The sample did
not include either Army infantry colonels or generals who
had small-unit leadership experience in combat. Marine Corps
infantry officers were not included even though many had
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extensive combat experience. Lieutenant colonels who had
previously commanded were not representative in the sample.
It was assumed that that particular variables that occur be-
cause of the nature of the warfare (conventional vis-a-vis
unconventional) affected most of the population similarly
since the majority of the combat experiences was in the
military today was obtained in Southeast Asia.
The survey (Appendix A) consisted of four parts. Part
I consisted of four questions that asked for demographic
data. No identifying data were requested in order to pre-
serve the anonymity of the respondents. Part II consisted
of forty-five statements on human factors that affect combat
effectiveness. The respondents were asked to answer to what
degree they agreed or disagreed with on each statement. The
scale ranged from 1 to 5, strongly agree to strongly dis-
agree. In Part III, the respondents were next asked to rank
order nine human factors in order of their importance in
contributing to combat effectiveness and the will to fight.
The scale ranged from 1 to 9 , highest to lowest. These
factors were considered as either psychological or physio-
logical variables that could possibly enhance or degrade
combat effectiveness. In Part IV, the respondents were then
asked to answer two open questions if they so desired. These
questions were designed to give the respondents the oppor-
tunity to contribute any information on combat effectiveness




3ecause of the complexity of the subject being studied
and the number of intangible factors involved, this study
employed three types of questionnaire items. Hopefully,
through this instrument sufficient and mutually supporting
data will be obtained to support the given hypotheses. The
rating scale was chosen because it reflects both the direc-
tion and degree of opinion, and the results are more amenable
to analysis by statistical methods.
The primary purpose of the ranking of the human factors
was to try to determine the importance of each factor on
the battlefield when compared to all factors. Also, ranking
and rating techniques were generally comparable. The impor-
tance of each human factor to combat effectiveness should
ideally be reflected similarly on both the rating scale and
the ranking items. There were several advantages in using
open-ended questions. These questions allowed for the ex-
pression of issues of concern that may not have been explicit
in the closed-end items. An open-ended question allowed the
respondent to express views that were important to him and
how strongly he felt about a particular issue. Finally,
open-ended questions provided better insight and unique




Statistical analysis of the survey data was accomplished
with the aid of the statistical package for the social sciences
(SPSS)
.
Part II was analyzed in the following manner. The
data was analyzed by comparing the mean responses of each
human factor. The hypothesis being tested was:
H Q : There are no relationships among the ninehuman factors outlined in this study and
combat effectiveness on the battlefield.
H,: There is a relationship among the human
factors of leadership and training, with
combat effectiveness on the battlefield.
Subsequently, if training was found to be a related factor
to combat effectiveness, it was then assumed that soldiers
could be trained to withstand the rigors of battle. The
hypothesis being tested was:
H
n
: Soldiers could be adequately prepared during




: Soldiers could not be adequately prepared
during peacetime to withstand the psycho-
logical rigors of combat.
The hypothesis was tested by utilizing a student's t-test.
This test showed whether the observed differences in the
means of the significant factors (x 2 or x >_ 4 was con-
sidered significant) were due solely to sampling error to
population differences as well at the .05 level.
A t-test was also administered between the means of
-raining factor and the other human factors to determine if
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training was a significant factor that was related to combat
effectiveness
.
A factor analysis was conducted utilizing varimax rota-
tion to determine if an underlying pattern of relationships
existed which would allow the reduction of the 45 responses
in Part II to a different, even more manageable number of
factors. The factor analysis presented the true number of
factors at work within the study, of what variables the
factors consisted of, their degree of interaction, and the
magnitude of their influence. The analysis yielded several
significant factors. Only variables that loaded high (a
loading of .45000 or higher was considered high) were listed
as comprising the specific factor.
Finally, a bivariate analysis of the data from Part II of
the survey was conducted. The results provided information
on whether the human factors were somehow correlated.
Part III was initially analyzed using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov
one-sample test. This test analyzed the goodness of fit of
the reported data by determining whether the observed data
could have reasonably come from a theoretically normal dis-
tribution. Thus, this test showed whether a significant
difference existed between the rankings in each category.
Basically, the hypothesis being tested was:
H
n
: There are not any differences between the
rankings of the factors and any observed
differences are merely chanced variations
to be expected in a random sample.
H-,: There are significant differences in the




If the observed value of the maximum absolute deviation
was such that the probability associated with its occurrence
was less than or equal to .05, the hierarchy of the signifi-
cant factors would be determined by calculating the frequency
of each category. The importance of each human factor would
be determined by how low its assigned frequency was. Again,
if training was found to have a low frequency, it was inter-
preted that soldiers could be trained to withstand the rigors
of combat.
Next, the Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient was
determined to compare the rank orders of the respondents in
terms of their degree of agreement with each other. Spearman's
r were calculated to give some measure of how the respondents'
rankings of factors were similar or dissimilar with each
other. In other words, how were the factors related to each
other in the context of how the respondents tended to rank
order them. Spearman's r was defined as the sum of the
squared differences in the paired ranks for two variables over
all cases divided by what the squared differences in ranks
would have been had the sets of rankings been totally
independent.
Part IV, the open-ended questions, were analyzed by simply
presenting the quoted statements of the respondents. State-
ments were grouped in terms of a common theme and uniqueness
of thought.







Analysis of the demographic data yielded the following
information about the sample profile. Mean time in service
was 18.5 years with a range from 16 to 24 years. The mean
length of combat experience was 1.84 years with a range from
ten months to 3 years. The mean age of the respondents was
40.12 years with a range from 35 years to 45 years. Seven
of the respondents received their commissions from USMA;
twenty-eight from ROTC; thirteen from OCS , and; one from a
direct commission.
3. COMPILATION OF RESPONSES
A summary of the data in Part II of the survey (responses
concerning the human factors) was presented in Appendix B.
The respondents tended to agree that leadership was related
to combat effectiveness. This was indicated by the group
mean of questions pertaining to leadership in Part II of the
survey (Appendix C) . The leadership factor was. followed by
the factors of acceptance by the unit and the ability to
withstand fire, both of which had the same mean.
A t-test was conducted between the group mean of the
items in the survey that represented leadership and the group
mean of the items that represented the other eight human
factors to determine whether there was a significant differ-
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factors because it was the only factor to have x <_ 2 . The
t-test was conducted to test the following hypothesis:
H
Q
: There are no relationships among the
nine human factors outlined in this study
and combat effectiveness on the battlefield.
H, : There is a relationship among the human
factor of leadership and combat effective-
ness on the battlefield.
If the earlier assumptions were correct, the results of
the test would have allowed the rejection of the null hy-
pothesis and the acceptance of the alternate hypothesis.
This would indicate that certain human factors affected
combat effectiveness differently at the .05 significance
level
.
The t-test indicated a significant difference between
leadership and the other human factors. The t-value of -12.21
had a probability of occurrence close to zero, well within
the .05 significance value. The results allowed the rejec-
tion of the null hypothesis and the acceptance of hypothesis
1. Thus, it was deduced from these findings that there were
differences between the combined human factors and leadership
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in terms of their relationship to combat effectiveness and
that the observed differences in the group means were not
the result of chanced variations to be expected in a random
sample
.
To test whether training was significant in preparing
soldiers for combat, a t-test was conducted in Part II of
the survey between the group mean of the items that repre-
sented training and the group mean that represented the other
eight items to see whether the difference between the two
means were significantly different at the .05 significance
level (Table II) . The hypothesis being tested was:
H-. : There are no relationships among the nine
human factors outlined in this study and
combat effectiveness on the battlefield.
H~ : There is a relationship among the human
factor of training and combat effective-
ness on the battlefield.
TABLE II

















3ased on these results , it could be implied that training
was not found to be significantly different from the other
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human factors. The t-value of 1.15 had a probability of
occurrence .256 which was greater than the .05 significance
level. This meant it could not be concluded from the data
that training among the human factors was considered signi-
ficantly related to combat effectiveness. Thus, the results
of the t-test showed that the respondents did not consider
training to be related to combat effectiveness more so than
any other identified human factor. Based on these results,
the null hypothesis was accepted and hypothesis 2 was
rejected.
Utilizing the Kaiser Criterion, factor analysis of the
data in Part II of the survey yielded twelve factors with
eigenvalues of 1.0 or greater. Analysis was limited to the
first seven of these factors which accounted for 76.6 percent
of the total variance of the factors (Appendix D)
.
Utilizing the factor loadings in the varimax rotated
factor matrix, only questions from Part II of the survey
which loaded higher than .45000 were considered in the
analysis (Appendix E) . Analysis of these seven factors
indicated that these factors were composed of the following
types of items--six items related to leadership, five items
related to training, three items related to the perception
of survivability, three items related to hunger, three items
related to acceptance by the unit, three items related to
combat experience, one item related to fatigue, and one item
related to the ability to withstand fire. Of these seven
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factors, three of these factors consisted of a predominant
cluster of questions that pertained to a particular human
factor. These factors were Factor 1 (Training) , Factor 3
(Leadership) , and Factor 4 (Leadership) . This led to the
conclusion that of the responses to the questions in Part II
of the survey, only those that pertained to leadership and
training tended to cluster together in any sort of magnitude.
This led to the belief that the respondents were fairly con-
sistent in their responses to questions that addressed these
two human factors.
The results of the bivariate analysis of the data from
Part II of the survey did not indicate significant correlation
(>
|
.40| ) between the human factors (Appendix F) . Although
many of the correlations were far from zero, the values were
not significant for a sample of this size.
C. ORDINAL RANKING
Part III of the survey (ordinal ranking) was initially
analyzed by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov one-sample test to deter-
mine whether there were significant differences between the
rankings of rhe respondents to support the assumption that
the rankings of the human factors were normally distributed
(Appendix G) .
The hypothesis that was tested was:
H
n
: There are not any differences between the
rankings of the factors and any observed
differences are merely chanced variations
to be expected in a random sample.
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H^: There are significant differences in the
rankings of the human factors at the .05
significance level that implies that the
data are normally distributed.
The results indicated there was a difference between
respondents among their ratings of the human factors. The
analysis determined the responses to be normally distributed.
Thus, the null hypothesis was rejected and hypothesis 3
was accepted.
As a result of the normal character of the data, cumula-
tive frequencies of scores of each of the nine human factors
were calculated to determine to what extent each of the fac-
tors affected combat effectiveness (Table III) . Since a
raint of "1" by the respondent indicated that the particular
human factor was the most important, it was assumed that
the lower the frequency, the greater the importance of the
particular human factor to combat effectiveness.
The results clearly indicated leadership ranked higher
than any other of the nine human factors in terms of impor-
tance to combat effectiveness. In addition, training was
rated second highest in importance. Based on these results,
it could be safely assumed that training was an important
factor that was significantly related to combat effectiveness
Finally, Part III of the survey was analyzed using the
Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient to determine the rela-
tionships between the human factors in the context of the
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9 HUNGER 386 .167 1.00
Like the results of the bivariate correlation test of
Part II, there seemed to be little relationship between most
of the variables. However, three pairs of the variables were
significantly related (> i.40,). These pairs of factors
were
:
1. Combat Experience with Soldier's Belief in Job
(negatively correlated)
.
2. Training with Acceptance by the Unit (negatively
correlated)
.












What was particularly interesting was the relationship
between combat experience and a soldier's belief that what
he was doing was right. This pheomenon will be discussed in
more detail in Chapter VI.
D. OPEN RESPONSES
Part IV of the survey was analyzed by presenting the data
in terms of general consensus and also uniqueness of thought
(Tables IV and V) . The data provided by the respondents was




Responses to Question 1, Part IV of the Survey
While leading in combat, what gave your soldiers the
will to fight?
"Confidence and faith that I, their leader, knew my job..."
"Confidence in their leaders."
"Unit identity and cohesion."
"Sense of togetherness."
"The desire to survive."




"Good, solid leadership by example."
"I believe that soldiers fight because they want to do
what is right.
"
"Believing in what they were doing."
"Fear of letting their buddies and leaders down..."
"Leadership.
"
"Confidence in their professional training."
"Outrage toward the enemy .
"
"Dynamic leaders of the 'down to earth', practical type."
"Peer pressure— image enhancement."
"Self-confidence.
"
"The belief that superior headquarters were concerned and




"The belief that if our foces did not kill, destroy, or
capture the enemy, the enemy would kill, destroy, and capture
us."
"Excellent small-unit leadership."
"Confidence that immediate leaders were knowledgeable
and were not foolhardy."
"Discipline.
"
"Fear of letting their buddies down."






Responses to Question 2, Part IV of the Survey
Are there are viable ways leaders can prepare soldiers
for combat?
"A leader in combat must have earned the respect of his
men . "
"Not within the current restrints . Prohibitions to
hazardous training environments precludes effective realism
which is needed to place stress on soldiers .
"
"Physical conditioning."
"Establish and maintain discipline in all the little
areas . "
"Train commanders to communicate with their soldiers."
"Make training hard and realistic."
"Live fire exercises which include overhead fire, close
artillery, and mortar fire."
"Foster a sense of cohesion and mutual confidence based
on shared experiences .
"
"Tough and realistic training."
"Nothing can replace the din, the confusion, the moaning,
the death, the knowledge to control fear..."
"Mental toughness training."
"Develop and demand immediate reaction to orders."
"Discuss the realities of war with junior leader."






"Be concerned with soldiers and let it show."
"Lead by example."
"Focus on the use of weapon systems and phsycial training."
"Teach them to kill."
"Convince the soldiers you are competent and will not
needlessly endanger their lives."
"Stability in leaders procedures, SOPs, and crews."
"Let them see and hear competent leaders up front with
them.
"
"To be successful, we must learn to improvise and to do
without in training since we'll never have all we need in
combat.
"





A . S UMMARY
The study of combat effectiveness was characterized by a
host of complex and intertwined factors which made empirical
research difficult. A complete study of combat effectiveness
on the battlefield required the basic understanding of the
psychology of the individual soldier—namely, identifying the
motivators which gave the soldier the will to fight. The
difficulty of this task was illustrated by a study undertaken
by Tyagi et al., (1976). This study on courage found that
anxiety, leadership, personality make-up, morale, and job
efficiency individually did not determine courage.
This study attempted to provide empirical data which would
show what, if any, human factors were significantly related
to the combat effectiveness of the individual soldier on the
battlefield. This study focused on a sample of fifty infantry
battalion commanders who all had experience as small-unit
leaders in combat. Data was collected by administering a sur-
vey in which responses would be based on the personal experi-
ences of the respondents in combat. The survey was designed
around nine human factors that could affect the combat effec-
tiveness of soldiers in battle. These human factors were
leadership, training, acceptance by the unit (cohesion), a
soldier's belief in what he was doing, combat experience, the
ability to withstand fire, perception of survival possibility,
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hunger, and fatigue. Three different forms of responses
were requested in the survey. The first method used was an
interval scale to determine to what degree the respondents
agreed or disagreed whether certain human factors affected
combat effectiveness. The second method was an ordinal scale.
The respondents were asked to rank order the nine human fac-
tors in terms of the item's importance to combat effective-
ness. Finally, the third method consisted of two open-ended
questions. These questions were designed to provide additional
and in-depth information in two areas of inquiry--what moti-
vated soldiers to fight and what could be done to prepare
soldiers for the shock of combat. Two alternate hypotheses
were developed regarding the data: (H,) There was a signifi-
cant relationship among the nine human factors and combat
effectiveness on the battlefield, and (H
2 ) that a soldier
could be prepared to withstand the rigors of combat.
The results of this study fully supported hypothesis one
and partially supported hypothesis two. The results of Part
II of the survey indicated that among the nine human factors,
leadership was the most significantly related. This conclusion
was based en two phenomena. First, leadership had, by far,
the lowest group mean. Second, the statistical analysis be-
tween leadership and the other human factors indicated that
leadership was significantly different from the other factors.
Thus , the respondents tended to agree that leadership was an




The group mean of the training factor was not shown to be
significantly different from the combined means of the other
eight factors. Relative to the other factors, statistical
analysis determined that the training factor was not signi-
ficantly related to combat effectiveness. But the factor
analysis with varimax rotation of the data in Part II resulted
in Factor 1 consisting of six items, in which four of these
items pertained to training. Thus, it could be assumed that
since Factor 1 accounted for more variance than the other
factors, training was an important variable which accounted
for much of the variance in this factor. Although the results
in Part II of the survey were inconclusive in demonstrating
the importance of training to combat effectiveness, the
training factor could not be completely disregarded.
Further analysis of the data in Part II led to the conclu-
sion that the human factors were generally independent of each
other. The results of the bivariate correlation test failed
to show any significant correlation between the human factors.
This led to the assumption that respondents tended to agree
or disagree about the importance of a human factor irrespec-
tive of its realtionship to the other factors.
The analysis of the data in Part III of the survey sub-
stantiated the results of Part II. Due to the results of
the Xolmogorov-Smirnov one-sample test, the distribution of
rankings were assumed to be normal. Subsequently, the fre-
quency of the rating scores for each factor were used to
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determine the hierarchy of factors in terms of importance.
Leadership tended to be rated as the most important factor
that affected combat effectiveness. This conclusion was
based on the fact that leadership had the lowest frequency
of total rating scores.
The training factor received rating scores that had a
combined frequency second only to leadership. Although the
frequency of rating scores were not as low as those of leader-
ship, the scores were significantly lower than the scores pro-
duced by the third most important factor (combat experience)
.
The results were interpreted to mean that the respondents
tended to consider training to be an important factor to pre-
pare soldiers to be combat effective on the battlefield.
In terms of importance, the human factors of acceptance
by the unit and combat experience was considered fairly impor-
tant in determining combat effectiveness. A soldier's belief
in what he was doing was right and the ability to withstand
fire was generally rated toward the middle in importance.
Perception of survival possibility, hunger, and fatigue were
generally rated low in importance to combat effectiveness.
Unlike the results in Part II of the survey, three pairs
of the human factors were found to be significantly correlated
The Spearman rank correlation coefficient analysis indicated
acceptance by the unit was significantly correlated with train-
ing and the perception of survivability. What was especially
noteworthy was the correlation between combat experience and
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a soldier's belief in what he was doing was right. The rela-
tionship between these two factors could possibly be explained
by the "desensitization" process a soldier could undergo
during his tour in combat. The longer a soldier was exposed
to the realities of war, the less important beliefs, values,
and justification for his actions become.
Part IV of the survey provided results that generally
supported the findings in Parts II and III. Even though the
data in Part IV did not allow for any type of statistical
analysis, valuable information was obtained. The general
consensus among the respondents indicated that there were
certain human factors that were important to combat effective-
ness. Invariably, the respondents agreed that realistic train-
ing was key to preparing soldiers for combat. There were
numerous responses which indicated that leadership and cohe-
sion were very important factors that motivated soldiers to
fight. The respondents indicated that a soldier's faith in
his leaders was vital to combat effectiveness. Additionally,
the respondents generally felt that soldiers fought for their
"buddies." He was motivated to fight by the expectations by
his peers of him and the fear of letting "his buddies down."
Also, the respondents indicated a sense of survival and out-
rage to be significant motivators.
B. DISCUSSION
It was evident why leadership, relative to the other human
factors, was considered a very important factor that affected
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combat effectiveness. The basic premise that defined leader-
ship in the military was that the leader was responsible for
everything his soldiers did or failed to do. The responsi-
bility of the leader was both awesome and comprehensive. The
general feeling reflected by the results of the survey was
that, ultimately, the small-unit leader determined the effec-
tiveness of soldiers in combat. It is the leader's responsi-
bility to prepare and to motivate soldiers to fight effectively
on the battlefield. The respondents overwhelmingly seemed
to feel that the soldier's faith in his leadership directly
affected his motivation to fight. The results of Parts II
and III of the survey statistically reaffirmed the stated
feelings of the respondents— leadership was the most vital
ingredient to the combat effectiveness of men in battle.
Although training was not shown in Part II to be signifi-
cantly different from the other human factors, the training
factor was indicated to be important in Parts III and IV.
The respondents generally felt that realistic training was
necessary to prepare men for combat. It was implied from
this response that soldiers could be prepared to withstand
the psychological rigors of combat. Thus, the better trained
a soldier was, the better his chances to survive and to fight
effectively in combat.
Surprisingly, the respondents did not consider combat ex-
perience nor cohesion as dominating factors that affected
combat effectiveness. It could be that while combat experi-
ence improved one's chances of survival, it did not necessarily
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improve one's combat effectiveness. For example, over a period
of time in combat a soldier might learn to avoid tasks and
missions that might be hazardous to him but vital to the over-
all mission. This could possibly be illustrated by the example
presented by Marshall previously discussed in Chapter II.
Marshall found that less than thirty percent of soldiers engaged
in combat fire their weapons. One explanation could be that
the learning process a soldier underwent dictated that soldiers
might have a better chance of survival if they did not expose
themselves and place fire upon the enemy.
Although acceptance by the unit was not indicated to be
a significant factor, the responses to Part IV of the survey
placed much importance on cohesion as an important part of
combat effectiveness. The respondents felt cohesion to be a
driving factor that motivated soldiers to fight. The importance
of cohesion in a war (Vietnam) characterized by short combat
tours was especially noteworthy. Considering the short tours
(thirteen months) and the individual replacement system,
cohesion was a factor that developed quickly within units.
Effective cohesion solidly established itself amidst high
turnover and short-term ccmraderie within the small unit.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
This section outlined two recommendations based on the
results of this study.
REC0MMENDATI0N1 : The current leadership program for
junior officers should be reviewed with particular attention
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to the addition of an education program on the "realities of
war." This program would generally entail educating young
officers on what could be expected on the battlefield in
terms of soldier behavior under fire and other psychological
variables
.
The small-unit leader must have become aware of how vital
his role as leader was to the survival of his subordinates
and to the -successful accomplishment of the mission. He must
have become as educated as he possibly could in a peacetime
environment on how soldiers would be expected to behave while
under fire. The leader must somehow have become aware of the
initial shock and din of high intensity warfare that could
encounter on the battlefield. Hopefully, by preparing the
leader for the psychological realities of battle beforehand,
casualties and the initial decrease of combat effectiveness
would be minimized.
The training requirements for this program would be mini-
mal. It would be pertinent that this program be presented
by seasoned combat veterans. Realism could be enhanced by
the extensive use of combat film footage.
RECOMMENDATION 2 : Ensure training is made as realistic
as possible at all levels of command. This should include
increased emphasis on live-fire maneuver exercises and sus-
tained combat operations.
The establishment of the National Training Center was
definitely a step toward the right direction. Here, battalion-
size units have the opportunity to maneuver and to employ
all of their weapon systems in a very realistic combat
fid

environment. The problem was that battalions have the oppor-
tunity to undergo this training once a year, at best. More
of this type of training should be made more available to
all levels of command much more frequently.
The effectiveness of combat units could be better evalu-
ated by field training exercises that lasted several weeks at
a time and that increased the stress level of soldiers. The
stress factor could be induced by sleep deprivation due to
sustained physical and mental activity and by meager and
infrequent food rations. It was very evident during short
term tactical evaluations (similar to the ARTEP) that most
leaders performed at a very high activity level with little
or no sleep. It was questionable whether these leaders could
maintain this activity during long periods of combat opera-
tions. In turn, this would question the combat effectiveness
of units in sustained operations.
C. FURTHER RESEARCH
Added research was definitely needed in the area of the
study of the psychological aspects of combat effectiveness.
There were two basic areas that research similar to this study
could be applied to increase the understanding of this compli-
cated subject.
First, data on the relationship between human factors and
combat effectiveness should be obtained from individuals with
ccmbat experience other than Vietnam. It was possible that
the results obtained from this study did not truly reflect
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the importance of human factors such as fatigue, hunger,
reconstitution, and the ability to sustain intense fire. The
following reasons could possibly explain the potential dis-
crepancies that could occur:
1. Combat soldiers in Vietnam did not, as a rule, experi-
ence ponderous indirect fire attacks as would be
expected from an attack from the Warsaw Pact nations.
2. Generally, soldiers were not kept in the combat zone
longer than thirteen months at a time during the Viet-
nam War. This period was much shorter than World War
II or the Korean Conflict.
3. Soldiers did not experience the debilitating effects
of severe cold weather which could decisively influence
combat effectiveness.
4. As a rule, there was never a serious resupplv problem
to units in combat in terms of food and the basic
supplies
.
5. Units generally rotated to rear areas for rest
regularly
.
Second, the sample in this study consisted of all officers
The possibility existed where the opinions expressed by the
sample might differ quite significantly from a sample consist-
ing of non-commissioned officers (NCOs) with combat experience
A study should be undertaken to compare the results between
officers and NCOs. Hopefully, the results could provide some
groundwork in clarifying and resolving differences between
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the two groups which, ultimately, should enhance the overall
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To: Questionnaire Recipient
This questionnaire is part of a study to determine to
what degree various human factors affect combat effectiveness
and the soldier's will to fight on the battlefield. Seme of
the factors being studied are fatigue, hunger, combat experience,
training, and the ability to withstand the shock of battle. We
believe that the best way to understand what factors affect the
combat effectiveness of the individual soldier is to ask infantry
leaders with extensive combat experience at the small unit level.
Thus we would deeply appreciate your cooperation in completing
this questionnaire.
Specific instructions on completing the questionnaire can
be found on the inside cover. .'lote that there are four parts
to the survey. Part I consists of basic demographic questions.
Part II asks to what extent do you agree or disagree with
certain statements that pertain to combat effectiveness. Part
III consists of dine factors that affect combat effectiveness
and the will to fight. This part asks you to rank order these
factors according to importance. Part IV are open ended questions.
Please feel free to add any comments on combat effectiveness
ar.c the soldier's will to fight that aay not have been touched
i:on in this questionnaire. The questionnaires are completely
confidential. The individual identity of respondents will not
:e recorded. Please return the questionnaire as soon as
possible
.
Thank you verv :nuch for your helo and valuable time
.





Oil questionnaire 13 self-explanatory. If there is any difficulty
in interpreting the questions , try to give the most reasonable answer
possible, when you are through, put the entire questionnaire in the
accompanying envelope and sail. It will probably take 30-35 ainutes
to complete the questionnaire
All responses will be <ept strictly confidential. There is not
a record of which individuals participate in the study. Complete




? art : : :eaocrapr.i: :aca
?or each of the following questions please check the box or fill in
the appropriate information which aost accurately indicates your
answer to the cuestion.
1. Age:



















4. Years of 3em.ce:
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3*rt :: Human factors That Affect Combat Effectiveness
The following are 45 statements on factors which aay affect combat effectiveness
and the will to fight of front line soldiers in a high intensity combat
environment. We are interested in knowing, based on your combat experience,
to what extent do you agree or disagree with each statement.
?tote : Read these answer choices over carefully.
Then answer each of the following questions
by placing an X in the box under the answer
you -want to give.
>. <3 >. a>
p4 S V ~i a
0» u y n
c u a •H 01 s a>
a 3 5 fl o u
U li u A u -n
«J 3» T> 2. •p4 4J -W
Ji < < z o a a a
1. Soldiers will continue to
fight effectively as long
as there is any hope for
survival
.
a a a a
greater nis cnances cf
survival
A combat unit snould be able —
j
to fight indefinitely without
[_
relief or rest.
3. The nam reason soldiers
fight 13 because at their
dedication and loyalty to
their buddies
.






The longer a soldier is in a
combat environment , the
-
The frequency and amount of . ,
rations a 3oldier in combat
receives significantly affect3
his will and ability to fight.
The aain reason soldiers
Eight is fear.
a a a
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3 . Current training doctrine
adequately prepares soldiers
for the shock of combat.
9 . The psychological effect of
ponderous artillery attack
on troops can greatly degrade




Combat survival cannot really
be taught out aust be gained
by experience.
11. How successful a unit is in
combat is determined by how
well-fed and nourished its
soldiers are.
12. The individual need to
survive is vnat motivates
soldiers to fight m
combat.
13 The amount of rest a unit has
is an important consideration
m determining wnether that
unit is committed into a
tactical combat -ussier..
14. :<ewiy formed squads with —
combat experienced soldiers are
aore combat affective than squads
that consist of soldiers that
r.ave worked together for a long
tune cut are not combat experienced.
13
.
Z. currently have the resources —
to properly train soldiers to
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There is no practical way to
prepare soldiers for the
psychological 3hocfc of ponderous
artillery bombardment
.
17. A unit that has seen engaged in
combat for three :r sore aonths
is far acre able to succeed _-.
accomplishing a tactical session
than a newly committed "green"
unit.
13. Hunger diminishes a soldier's
mill to tight.
13. A unit' 3 combat effectiveness
depends aaialy on its
leadership.
20. A soldier's will to fight
is significantly affected
by tail belief tnat what he
is doing is right.
21. A 3oldier will lose his will
to fight as the reality of
war death and destruction)
becomes aore apparent.
12 . ArtL'ij"s and other evaluation
tools accurately measure
how well a tombac unit will
survive and fignt _-. tombac
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The will to fight is
affacted oy fatigue.
:onsiderabiy l 1
24. As casualties within a soldier'
squad increases, his will to
fignt becomes aore intense.
25. A soldier's fighting ability
diminishes significantly if,
because of combat losses, he
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26. It can be determined how well a
soldier will fight by how well
he performs ia training.
27 . The longer the period of combat
experience a soldier obtains,
the greater his will to fight.
28. A soldier aust :<now why a
particular tactical operation
is tailing place if he is to
be combat effective.
29. A unit that is not well-fed
will eventually become combat
ineffective
.
30. A soldier' 3 values aust be
congruent with the goals
and cb^ectives he is fighting
for if he is to Tva-inrain his
will to fight.
31. Soldiers will cease to be combat
effective wnen they perceive
that there is no hope for victory.
22. A soldier '3 initial reaction to
hi3 first cattle experience is
that cf shocx.
33. A unit cannot become ccmbat
effective without good leadership.
24. morale and the will to fight is
greatly ennanced cy frequent and
adequate rations.
35. A soldier will lose hi3 will to
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3". The clearer a soldier'
s
under standing of the reason
for a particular tactical
operation, the greater his
willingness to fight.
23 . A combat unit cannot fight
affectively without cohesive-
3S33 and communication among
its members
.
39. It :s the primary responsibil-
ity of the 3mall unit leader
to motivate his soldiers to
fight.
40. Z am confident that soldiers
can he trained to withstand
the psychological rigors of
combat
.
41. A soldier' 3 will to fight and
chances of 3urvivaoility
depend significantly on his
acceptance as a member of bis
squad and platoon by tila peers
42. Mo matter what the odds are
against victory, a im: will
iignt indefinitely if tnere
is affective leadership.
43. Z- is most prooaole that a
a.-iit will maintain its will
to fight and combat
effectiveness av»n though its
leaders nave become casualties
44. A unit will fig at only as well
n .ts leaders can lead.
45. It :3 the responsibility of
tne leader to control fear
in hla soldiers .
>. a >» V
M s V -H »
3» u 3» H
s a a -•* 7> S 3»
o s 3 z fl fl
•) M u M J) u a
J 3» 3» Qi •H — —
»
Ji < < z o a •a a
G D
D D D D D
n n a a
- a c
a. a n n
a c n i i
a d a
a a a n
a a a d
75

Part III; Please ranX order the following human factors in order of
their importance in contributing to combat effectiveness




perception of survival possibility




acceptance and sense of belonging to unit




Part TV: Open Questions
Please add any comments or opinions pertaining to the following questions
vru.cn aay add aore insight into our study of combat affectiveness and
the soldier's will to fight.
1. While leading m combat, what gave your soldiers the will to fight'











SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS OF THE DATA IN PART II OF THE SURVEY
QUESTION HUMAN FACTOR MEAN STANDARD DEVIATION
1 Training
2 Fatigue







8 Training 3.58 1.07
9 Ability to 1.76 .657
Withstand Fire
10 Combat Experience 3.46 1.07
11 Hunger 3.86 .808
12 Perception of 2.50 1.07
Survival
Possibility
13 Fatigue 2.24 .870
14 Combat Experience 3.44 .9 29
15 Training 3.12 1.24
16 Ability to 2.88 1.19
Withstand Fire
17 Combat Experience 1.64 .663
18 Hunger 2.84 1.04
19 Leadership 1.64 .722

20 A Soldier's Belief 2.08 .804
in the Mission
21 Perception of 3.78 .764
Survival
Possibility
22 Training 3.42 1.11
23 Fatigue 2.06 .767
2 4 Acceptance by Unit 3.22 1.04
25 Acceptance by Unit 2.82 .962
26 Training 2.80 .969
27 Combat Experience 3.16 1.02
28 Soldier's Belief 3.10 1.07
in Mission
29 Hunger 2.74 1.01
30 Soldier's Belief 2.66 1.10
in Mission
31 Perception of 3.22 1.06
Survival
Possibility
32 Combat Experience 2.30 1.04
33 Leadership 1.46 .503
34 Hunger 2.22 .840
35 Fatigue 2.62 .923
36 Leadership 2.22 .887
37 Soldier's Belief 2.16 .912
in Mission
38 Acceptance by Unit 1.50 .544
39 Leadership 1.70 .70 7
40 Training 1.8 8 .799














PERCEPTIONS OF COMBAT COMMANDERS AS TO THE INTENSITY OF
IMPORTANCE OF INDIVIDUAL HUMAN FACTORS TO COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS
HUMAN STANDARD
FACTOR RANK MEAN DEVIATION VARIANCE
Leadership 1 1.97 .487 .237
Acceptance 2 2.32 .697 .485
by unit
Ability to 2 2.32 .792 .627
withstand fire
A soldier's 3 2.50 .688 .473
belief in
his mission
Training 4 2.67 .742 .560
Combat 5 2.71 .750 .562
Experience
Hunger 6 2.38 .600 .358
Fatigue 7 2.89 1.279 1.636






RESULTS OF THE FACTOR ANALYSIS
PERCENTAGE CUMULATIVE
FACTOR EIGENVALUE OF VARIANCE PERCENTAGE
1 4.822 17.9 17.9
2 4.069 15.1 33.1
3 3.075 11.4 44.5
4 2.467 9.2 52.7
5 2.251 8.4 62.1
6 2.188 8.1 70.2




COMPOSITION OF THE RESULTS OF THE FACTOR ANALYSIS
Major Human Factors Comprising Factor 1
RANK QUESTION HUMAN FACTOR LOADING
1 24 Acceptance by the unit
(casualties)
.74423
2 15 Training ( resources) .71388
3 22 Training (evaluation) .67206
4 8 Training (doctrine) .64942













Perception of survival .79531
(hope for victory)
Fatigue (sustained combat .68377
operations)
Perception of survival .59222
(reality of war)






















Major Human Factors Comprising Factor 4
RANK QUESTION HUMAN FACTOR LOADING
1 19 Leadership .82767
2 42 Leadership (will to fight) .68511
3 45 Leadership (control fear) .49828
Major Human Factors Comprising Factor 5
RANK QUESTION HUMAN FACTOR
1 41 Acceptance by the unit
2 2 6 Training (performance
in training)






Major Human Factors Comprising Factor 6
RANK QUESTION HUMAN FACTOR LOADING
1 34 Leadership . 70497
2 27 Combat experience .53481
3 36 Acceptance by the unit .51653
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RESULTS OF THE KOLMOGOROV-SMIRNOV ONE-SAMPLE TEST
KOLMDGOROV- MAXIMUM
SMIRNOV ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM MAXIMUM 2-TAIL
Z SCORE DIFFERENCE (+ DIFFERENCE) (- DIFFERENCE) PROBABILITY








EXP TNG LDRSHP POSS UNIT HUNG
ABIL SOLDIERS
TO WITH BELIEF IN
FATI FIRE MISSION
CBT
EXP 1.0 .06 .18 .08
TNG .06 1.0 .16 .06




.08 .06 - .03 1.0
BY
UNIT - .26 - .43 .01 - .40
HING
FATI
26 .14 .04 .02
43 - .18 - .04 .16
01 - .36 .13 - .07
-
.40 - .14 - .30 04
1.0 - .13 .08 - .14
.14 - .18 - .36 - .14 - .13 1.0 .08 - .05
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